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It is widely agreed that the causal theory of reference for natural kind terms can be used as a
central ingredient in an argument that, if successful, shows that theoretical identity statements
such as (1) are necessary, if true:
(1) Water is H2O. 
However,  Nathan  Salmon  (1981)  has  famously  argued  that  one  cannot  derive  interesting
essentialist conclusions  merely from a causal theory of reference  à la Kripke and Putnam.
When it comes to natural kinds such as water in particular, Salmon claimed that, to argue for
natural kind essentialism, a non-trivial essentialist premiss concerning substances (or species,
natural phenomena, etc.) is also needed. My aim in this  paper is to challenge this widely
accepted  claim  and  sketch,  in  some  detail,  a  possible  way  of  arguing  for  natural  kind
essentialism, which does not require any additional essentialist premisses to be brought in.
Rather, this explanation sees essentialism as being already built in to the semantics of natural
kind terms.
But first, we should get clear on exactly what kind of an essentialist view is at issue here.
Claims such as “Water is necessarily H2O” can be read in two importantly different ways. On
one reading, they express de re necessities between kinds (thought of as abstracta), and have
the logical form of an identity statement: the kind water is identical with the kind H2O. On the
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other, they express the necessity of a quantified biconditional: on this reading (1) expresses
the proposition: x[x is (composed of) water ↔ x is (composed of) H2O].
In  discussions  of  natural  kind  essentialism,  the  two  readings  are  not  always  carefully
distinguished. Indeed, Kripke (1980) seems to move back and forth between the two kinds of
reading, in discussing various examples. Putnam's (1975) natural kind essentialism, on the
other  hand,  clearly  holds  that  statements  of  the  latter,  quantified  biconditional  kind,  are
metaphysically necessary, when true, and this is the reading Salmon adopts in responding to
Putnam. I will too, in this paper, understand natural kind essentialism (NKE) in this sense. As
stressed  by  Mackie  (2006,  170),  the  latter  reading  is  weaker  than  the  former,  in  some
important ways. One may well hold that statements of the latter kind are true, without wanting
to include kinds in one's ontology, and thereby without accepting the truth of statements of the
former kind. Moreover, NKE in the sense relevant here does not explicitly ascribe essential
properties to kinds, let alone members of kinds. What it does, rather, is specify properties that
are  essential  for  kind  membership:  having  a  certain  chemical  structure  is  necessary  for
belonging in the extension of the term “water”.
Here is Salmon's (1981, 166-167) reconstruction of a Putnamian argument for the relevant
natural kind essentialist claim (numbering mine):
(2) [Something is a sample of water iff it is a sample of dthat (the same substance
that this is a sample of)]
(3) This (liquid sample) has the chemical structure H2O.
(4) Being a sample of the same substance as something consists in having the same
chemical structure.
Therefore,
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(5) (Every sample of water has the chemical structure H2O)
While something like (2) is (the qua problem aside) plausibly derivable from a causal theory
of  reference  for  natural  kind  terms,  and (3)  reports  the  relevant  empirical  finding,  (4)  is
neither a product of the theory of reference, nor a part of the empirical finding about water,
but  an  independent,  non-trivial  essentialist  premiss.  Salmon's  argument  has  gained  wide-
spread acceptance: while most causal theorists are happy to accept something like premiss (4),
they seem to agree, by and large, that some such non-trivial essentialist premiss is needed in
order to argue for essentialism on the basis of semantics.
Occasionally some doubts are expressed about this, however. For example, after having
expressed  sympathy  with  Salmon's  argument,  Alexander  Bird  and  Emma  Tobin  add  the
following:
However, one might alternatively take the view that semantics and metaphysics
are more intimately related. For example, one might hold that the semantics itself
makes  certain  metaphysical  assumptions  [...]  According  to  the  view  that  the
correct  semantics  implies  an  essentialist  metaphysics,  the  semantic  claim that
‘water’ is a rigid designator is itself metaphysically loaded. But this is not to say
that  Putnam,  Kripke,  and  other  philosophers  are  smuggling  in  metaphysical
assumptions. Rather, it  is to say that competent users of the term tacitly make
those  assumptions.  Putnam's  Twin  Earth  thought  experiments  make  those
assumptions explicit. (Bird & Tobin 2008, 58)
Bird and Tobin do not, however develop the idea further, or attempt to defend it – they merely
mention it as a possible position. My aim in this paper is to develop, in some detail, one way
of arguing for such a position. In my view, there is an independently attractive explanation of
why statements like (1) are necessary if true, one that does not rely on antecedent non-trivial
essentialist premises on the part of the theorist. Rather, on this explanation a certain kind of
essentialist preference is already built in to the semantics of natural kind terms, in the way
ordinary competent speakers use these terms.
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My argument will be based on three assumptions: two theoretical ones, and one empirical
one. I have argued for both of the theoretical assumptions in recent work; I will not present
the full arguments for these assumptions here, but rather state them in a way that makes them
directly relevant to the question at hand, as well as give a condensed version of the arguments
supporting  them.  The  empirical  assumption,  I  claim,  is  quite  strongly  supported  both  by
everyday  experience  (including  thought  experimentation)  as  well  as  empirical  data  from
psychology.  In effect,  I  am here arguing for a conditional claim:  if one accepts my three
assumptions – assumptions which I take to be plausible and by no means highly revisionary –
then a certain kind of derivation of NKE becomes available, and this derivation proceeds
without reliance on antecedent essentialist premisses.
1. Theoretical Assumption 1: the explanation of necessary a posteriori identity
statements
The derivation (2) – (5) relies implicitly on the notion of rigid designation. The necessity in
(2)  arises  from  the  assumption  that  “water”  is  a  rigid  designator,  designating  the  same
substance in all possible worlds. The criteria for being the same substance, in turn, are thought
to be independent of the semantics: once the word “water” latches on to an actual sample, the
sameness relation described in (4) will, as it were, take care of the rest. The causal theory does
not provide the sameness-relation; this needs to be assumed as an additional premiss.
However, there is a problem. Although Kripke and Putnam clearly did take natural kind
terms to be rigid designators, and took this feature to play a central role in explaining the
necessity of theoretical identifications, they never provided a definition of rigidity for general
terms such as “water” (or predicates such as “is [composed of] water”). Kripke only gave one
for singular terms. And as is by now widely acknowledged as a result of a fairly voluminous
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discussion1,  there's  no obvious and unproblematic way of extending the notion of rigidity
from singular terms to general terms.
A seemingly natural way of defining rigid designation for general terms – and one that is
often assumed in discussion – would be as follows: a general term is rigid iff it denotes the
same property in all possible worlds. However, it is widely recognized that this runs the risk
of overgeneralizing, even trivializing the notion of rigidity: not only will natural kind terms
such  as  “water”  and  “tiger”  be  rigid  according  to  this  account,  so  will  terms  such  as
“bachelor” (denoting bachelorhood in all possible worlds) and “thermometer” (denoting the
property of being a thermometer), and so on. Some argue that this is a feature, rather than a
bug, of this account. However, I've argued elsewhere (Haukioja 2012) that rigidity, so defined,
cannot do the theoretical work that is relevant for my purposes here, namely that of explaining
the necessity of a posteriori identity statements.
In a nutshell, the problem is the following. The usual assumption, found already in Kripke,
is that identity statements between rigid expressions are necessary, if true. But if we accept the
above characterisation of rigidity for general terms, this is obviously not the case: we should
then expect “all and only renates are cordates” to be necessary (if true) as well, since on the
view in question “renate” and “cordate” come out rigid.  But “renates are cordates” is not
necessary, if true. So, whether or not there are other reasons to adopt the notion of rigidity for
general terms under discussion, it should be clear that it is not  this semantic feature that is
doing the work in deriving the essentialist claims that concern us here.2
1 Some of the central works are: Soames 2002; Martí 2004; Devitt 2005; LaPorte 2013.
2 Two clarifications are in order. First, (2) – (5) does not explicitly appeal to the rigidity of “ H2O” (which I
think is telling, cf. below), and the derivation is therefore not directly of the sort mentioned here. However,
Kripke and Putnam clearly do assume that true identifications between rigid terms should be necessary, and
some examples discussed in the literature (such as “Brontosaurus is Apatosaurus”) make explicit use of the
assumption. Secondly, kind identities are sometimes (often by proponents of the notion of rigidity under
discussion  here,  cf.  LaPorte  2013)  construed  as  identity  statements  between  abstracta  rather  than  as
quantified biconditionals (cf. above). However, this involves taking kind terms to be singular terms denoting
kinds, rather than general terms; moreover, on this understanding it is no longer obvious how a kind identity
could be a straightforward empirical discovery, since we do not observe kinds, but only their instances (for
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What  is doing  the  work,  then?  My  answer  is  as  follows.  Natural  kind  terms  differ
semantically from most other general terms in being actuality-dependent. Roughly, a term is
actuality-dependent iff some feature of the object or objects in its actual extension enters into
determining its extension in non-actual contexts of interpretation. For example, according to
causal theories of reference, “water” is actuality-dependent, since its extension in non-actual
worlds is partly determined by the structure of the stuff we actually refer to, with our tokens
of “water”. “Bachelor”, by contrast,  is not actuality-dependent, since its extension in non-
actual  worlds  is  not  determined  on  any  features  of  the  actual  bachelors,  but  is  rather
determined by the very same criteria as its actual extension. It is the actuality-dependence of
“water” that explains the necessity of (1): “H2O” merely spells out the nature of the stuff we
refer to as “water”, and since “water” is actuality-dependent, it picks out H2O in all possible
worlds, making (1) necessary.3 In fact, “H2O” is not actuality-dependent.
To  add  some details  to  this  rough  characterisation  that  will  be  relevant  later  on:  any
referring expression will have an applicability role associated with it, be it the satisfaction of a
descriptive characterisation, a causal role, or something wholly different. (Such applicability
roles need not be semantically associated with the relevant expressions.) The applicability role
associated with expression E specifies the criteria that an object, substance, etc. has to satisfy
in order for E to apply to it. Actuality-dependent expressions can now be defined as those
expressions which apply,  in non-actual  worlds,  to the things which possess the properties
which realise the relevant applicability role in the actual world. In other words, an actuality-
dependent expression has,  as its  extension,  the things which instantiate  the actual  realiser
property of the applicability role, or, in short its actual  ARR  (Applicability Role Realiser),
where the realiser property is not uniquely determined by the applicability role.  For example,
more on this see Haukioja 2012).
3 See Haukioja 2012 for more details.
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when Oscar and Toscar (on Earth and Twin Earth, respectively), produce the string “water”,
the applicability roles associated with their terms will be identical, but because of a difference
in their environments, different properties will realise that role, and the extensions of their
tokens of the string will thereby be different across possible worlds.4 An actuality-independent
expression,  in  contrast,  applies  in  non-actual  worlds  on  the  basis  of  the  very  same
applicability role as in the actual world.
The derivation of NKE on the basis of actuality-dependence is, to a first approximation, the
following:
(6)  (Something is a sample of water iff it instantiates the actual ARR of "water")
(7) The actual ARR of "water" is the chemical structure H2O
Therefore,
(5)  (Every sample of water has the chemical structure H 2O)
(6)  follows  from  the  actuality-dependence  of  “water”.  If  (7)  is  properly  described  as  a
straightforward empirical discovery, this derivation of NKE will not require any antecedent
essentialist premises. But for all that has been said so far, the following worry remains. If the
ARR  of  “water”  has  precise  enough  content  such  that  (7)  is  properly  described  as  a
straightforward  empirical  discovery,  can  we  plausibly  claim  that  (6)  follows  from  the
semantics? For  example:  if  the ARR of  “water” is  something like  the chemical  structure
shared by the stuff in the actual extension of “water”, (7) is surely an empirical discovery free
of hidden essentialism, but (6) simply does not follow from the semantics. To address this
worry, we will need to look at what it is that  makes an expression actuality-dependent, and
4 I remain neutral here with respect to questions of how the applicability role is represented by the speaker (if
at all), and if it is represented, whether it deserves to be thought of as narrow content.
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what determines how the extension of an actuality-dependent expression is determined in non-
actual worlds.
2. Theoretical Assumption 2: determination of reference
What determines what our terms refer to in general,  and what they refer to in non-actual
worlds in particular? Here, it is important to note that such questions are ambigous between
two quite different readings. The role of internal vs. external factors can be raised on both
readings, and accordingly two different internalism/externalism distinctions can be made, and
we should take care to distinguish between them.5
First,  note  that  actuality-dependent  expressions  have,  in  a  very  familiar  sense,  an
externalist semantics. If “water” is actuality-dependent, this  entails that its reference is, at
least in non-actual worlds, determined by factors external to the speaker, namely by the actual
ARR  of  “water”.  By  contrast,  actuality-independent  expressions  can  have  an  internalist
semantics. (But they need not – this will depend on whether the relevant applicability role is
internally determined. For example, on a strong social externalist view the applicability role
of  “bachelor”  may  be  partly  externally  determined,  although  the  term  is  actuality-
independent).  This  internalism/externalism  distinction  is  concerned  with  the  question  of
whether  or  not  the  criteria  for  the  applicability  of  an  expression  are  determined  by  the
speaker's individual psychology; let us call these views first-order internalism and externalism
(cf. Cohnitz & Haukioja 2013).
But another question concerns what makes it the case that a given expression has the kind
of  semantics  that  it  has.  What  makes  it  the  case,  for  example,  that  “water”  is  actuality-
dependent  (supposing  that  it  is),  and  thereby  has  first-order  externalist  semantics,  while
5 The  two distinctions  are  elaborated  in  much  more  detail  in  Cohnitz  &  Haukioja  (2013),  although  the
connection to actuality-dependence is not explicitly made there.
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“bachelor”  is  actuality-independent?  Again,  an  internalist  and  an  externalist  answer  is
possible.  According to  meta-externalism,  the fact that expressions have the semantics that
they  do  is,  at  least  partly,  determined  by  factors  external  to  the  speaker's  individual
psychology,  whereas  according  to  meta-internalism,  such  facts  are  determined  by  facts
internal to the speaker in question.
In Cohnitz & Haukioja (2013) we argue at length against meta-externalism, on the basis
that a meta-externalist position fails to make sense of the role of reference, and theories of
reference, in explaining successful linguistic communication. We also raise a suspicion that,
because the two internalism/externalism distinctions have not  been distinguished carefully
enough, many have illicitly taken our evidence for first-order externalism to also count as
evidence for meta-externalism.
The  alternative  meta-internalist  view  allows  that  the  extensions  of  at  least  some
expressions are partly externally determined – it is consistent with first-order externalism –
but holds that the fact that this is the case is determined by something to do with the speaker's
individual psychology. Meta-internalism, as such, leaves room for a variety of different views
on which internal features determine the semantics of a speaker's terms. Our preferred version
is a dispositionalist one. What makes it the case, in general, that a given expression is to be
given  a  first-order  internalist  or  externalist  semantics  has  to  do  with  our6 patterns  of
application  and  interpretation  (including  our  dispositions  to  apply  and  interpret  our
expressions  in  conditions  that  are  non-actual,  as  well  as  our  dispositions  to  revise  our
application  and  expression  in  response  to  empirical  information,  cf.  below).  For  some
expressions, such as “bachelor”, our patterns and dispositions of application and interpretation
6 I will write, in plural, of our dispositions, since I believe such dispositions are, as a matter of fact, widely
shared by actual speakers. However, strictly speaking a meta-internalist view will claim that the semantics of
a speaker's expressions, including whether and how the reference of the speaker's terms is dependent on
his/her physical and social environment, is wholly determined by the individual psychology of the speaker.
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are unaffected by contingent features of the actual world around us—the properties associated
with the expression are taken to be decisive for the question of whether the expression applies
to a given individual or not. With other expressions we have dispositions to 'shift the burden'
of  determining  their  applicability  partly  to  external  factors.  In  the  case  of  “water”,  for
example,  we  have  dispositions  to  evaluate  the  correctness  of  actual  and  counterfactual
applications of the term according to whether or not the term is applied to samples which
share the underlying structure of the substance that is causally connected in the appropriate
way to our actual usage of “water” (or something similar: the details will depend on one's
preferred theory of reference).  We also have dispositions to  re-evaluate our application of
such terms in the face of new empirical information about what the world is like. This is what
makes “water” actuality-dependent.
To illustrate,  suppose that  we took a  representative  sample of  bachelors,  studied them
empirically, and found out that every single one of them has a certain neural structure – call it
N – while no individuals outside the sample have N. Would we then start to categorise people
as bachelors in other possible worlds according to whether or not they have neural structure N
or not? Surely not.  That is  just  not how “bachelor” works:  we would go on categorising
people as bachelors, in the actual world as well as in counterfactual ones, according to their
age, gender, and marital status.7 “Bachelor”, unlike “water”, has no aspirations to denote a
natural kind.
7 Or, consider another version: suppose that we found that, say, 99.7% of unmarried adult males have N, while
0.3% do not; at the same time, we find N present in a tiny proportion of married females. Would we revise
our categorisation of this small  minority of men as  bachelors  and instead include the married females?
Surely not. (Thanks to NN for this twist on the example). Were we to make a similar discovery about the
golden stuff, say that we find some of the metal we categorised as gold to have a different atomic number
than 99.7% of the rest, while a small sample of a greenish looking metal turns out to have the same atomic
number as  the other  99.7%, we would,  I  think,  revise our categorisation of  the 0.3% and consider  the
greenish stuff as gold.
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If what I've just said is roughly correct, then the meanings of actuality-dependent terms
include, as it were, a placeholder to be filled in by the actual world, and this placeholder exists
because of our dispositions to use these terms. The question of which expressions, if any, are
actuality-dependent  is  then  ultimately  an  empirical question  concerning  our  linguistic
dispositions. Likewise, the question of what kinds of things are eligible to fill this placeholder,
i.e. what the applicability roles, and thereby the ARRs of our actuality-dependent terms are,8
will be determined by our dispositions.
3. Empirical Assumption: essentialist dispositions
Do we, as a matter of fact, have the kinds of burden-shifting dispositions mentioned above,
with respect to natural kind terms? Everyday experience, at least everyday experience about
philosophers, indicates that we do. The kinds of intuitions we, for the most part, report having
in response to Twin Earth-style thought experiments are precisely of this kind. But of course
such intuitions can be, and have been, denied: one may worry about how representative a
sample philosophers are here. Furthermore, one might doubt whether it really is reasonable to
assume that ordinary speakers have the quite complex kinds of dispositions that are required
for my view to work.
However,  a  considerable  amount  of  relevant  empirical  evidence  exists  in  psychology,
under the heading of “psychological essentialism” (for summaries, see Gelman 2004; Gelman
& Ware 2012). This is the hypothesis that humans generally believe and assume that natural
categories such as substances and biological species have an underlying reality that cannot be
directly observed, and that is causally responsible for the outward characteristics and shared
features of the members or instances of that category. This hypothesis is well supported by a
range of empirical data, across cultures and educational backgrounds – indeed, even subjects
8 More precisely: what the ARRs of our actuality-dependent terms are, given a way the actual world is like.
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with  no  formal  education  and  no  familiarity  with  modern  science  share  such  beliefs.
Moreover,  the dominant version of psychological essentialism is  placeholder essentialism,
according to which humans believe  that categories possess essences without knowing  what
those essences are (Medin & Ortony 1989).
It should be obvious that psychological essentialism (especially of the placeholder variety)
fits extremely well with the view I've been developing here. It can, of course, be questioned
whether psychological essentialism, as a theory that posits essentialist beliefs in children and
adults, is the best, or sufficient, psychological theory for explaining the relevant data (cf. Malt
1994; Strevens 2000). What matters most for my purposes here is that the studies supporting
psychological essentialism are categorisation studies, where subjects are typically invited to
make  verbal judgements  about  various  scenarios.  As  such,  these  studies  provide  indirect
evidence for the view that natural kind terms are actuality-dependent: we are, in our usage of
natural kind terms, guided by a tacit assumption about underlying essences. Moreover, the
studies give us an indication on what the ARRs for our natural kind terms are: they are, at
least roughly, those properties, whichever they are, which are actually causally responsible for
the shared observable characteristics of members of the relevant natural kind.
These studies do not provide evidence for the kinds of  corrective dispositions that were
mentioned above: dispositions to re-evaluate and possibly reverse one's applications of natural
kind  terms  in  the  face  of  new  empirical  evidence  about  what  the  actual  world  is  like.
However, a study I was involved in (Jylkkä, Railo & Haukioja 2009) did look at precisely
these kinds of dispositions, in non-philosophers, and found that lay speakers do, by and large,
have the kinds of dispositions which would make natural kind terms actuality-dependent.
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4. Putting the assumptions together
If all three assumptions are accepted, we get an explanation of why identifications such as (1)
are  necessary  if  true.  We  saw  earlier  that,  given  my  first  theoretical  assumption  about
actuality-dependence, we get a derivation of NKE as follows:
(6)  (Something is a sample of water iff it instantiates the actual ARR of "water")
(7) The actual ARR of "water" is the chemical structure H2O
Therefore,
(5)  (Every sample of water has the chemical structure H 2O)
Now, given the empirical assumption and the second theoretical assumption, we can safely
assume that natural kind terms such as “water” are actuality-dependent. Moreover, we get a
more precise specification of the ARR of “water”:  ordinary speakers using the term have
dispositions that make it the case that that “water” applies, in non-actual worlds, to substances
on the basis of whether or not a substance in that world possesses those underlying properties
which are, in the actual world, causally responsible for the observable characteristics of water.
In other words, we get the following derivation of NKE:
(8)  (Something is a sample of water iff it  possesses that underlying property which
is actually causally responsible for the observable characteristics of the stuff in the
actual extension of  "water")
(9) The underlying property which is actually causally responsible for the observable
characteristics of the stuff in the actual extension of  "water" is the chemical structure
H2O
Therefore,
13
(5)  (Every sample of water has the chemical structure H 2O)
(8) follows from the theory of reference, if my three assumptions are granted. No additional
premisses concerning essences of kinds are needed for the derivation to go through; (8) only
relies on an independent assumption about the criteria of sameness for properties. (9), on the
other hand, is a straightforward empirical discovery about the actual world. Here we have,
then,  a  derivation  of  natural  kind  essentialism  that  requires  no  antecedent  essentialist
premisses. The explanation does, to be sure, rely on essentialist dispositions or assumptions,
on the part of ordinary speakers: this is part of what makes “water” actuality-dependent, and
thereby  makes  (8)  true.9 But,  crucially,  the  explanation  does  not  rely  on  any essentialist
assumptions that we,  as theorists,  have to accept as true in order for the derivation to go
through. Rather, (8) is due to the essentialist assumptions ordinary speakers have, in their use
of “water” – assumptions which become apparent in our judgements about Twin Earth-style
scenarios.10 Given that  the actual  world co-operates  with such assumptions sufficiently  to
make some theoretical identification statement such as (1) true, the identification statement
will then be true across possible worlds, delivering NKE.
9 In an interesting recent paper, Sarah-Jane Leslie (2013) argues that the kinds of intuitions elicited by Twin
Earth-style thought experiments are, indeed, reflections of psychological essentialism, but that we should
take them to be systematically false, given that findings in natural sciences such as biology and chemistry
seem to conflict with such essentialism. We should note, however, that the kinds of essentialist intuitions we
have (and which are manifested in thought experimentation) are remarkably flexible. “H 2O” is, in Putnam's
discussion, just as much a placeholder as “c-fibres” is in Kripke's – indeed, Putnam considers the epistemic
possibility of  “water” turning out to be a jade-like disjunctive kind. We have, in our ordinary usage of
natural  kind  terms,  a  strong  preference  for  unified  underlying  essences,  but  are  willing  to  settle  for
something far less unified and even disjunctive, if that is the most that the actual world gives us. As long as
we, as speakers, are disposed to let an underlying property determine the modal profile of a natural kind
term, that property qualifies as a possible essence.
10 Note that such essentialist assumptions need not be (and in all likelihood are not) very specific at all, and
definitely nothing as specific as Salmon's (4). Rather, the essentialist assumption is merely a preference for
some explanatory  unity  underlying the  observable  characteristics  of  members  of  the  kind  (cf.  previous
footnote). The precise nature of the explanatory unity – whether it has to do with chemical structure or
something completely different – is an empirical matter.
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5. Conclusion
One may feel that the kind of essentialism delivered by my derivation falls short of “real”
essentialism. I sympathise with this: indeed, I noted early on that the kind of NKE I have here
discussed is a relatively weak claim. This is, I think, the most that one can get, by Twin Earth-
style argumentation – a stronger natural kind essentialist view about kinds as abstracta would
need to be argued for on different grounds.11
If an argument for a stronger essentialist view can be given, this is not in conflict with my
view. If  such an argument is  not  available,  then we should adopt a  conferralist  view (cf.
Sveinsdottir  2008,  Sveinsdottir  2013),  according  to  which  our  practices  and  assumptions
confer essentiality on certain properties. There is an element of anti-realism in such a view,
but it is important to note that none of the properties that are taken as essential are conferred
properties; it is only the  essentiality of these properties that is conferred. The things in the
world have the properties they do quite independently of us, but the fact that some of these
count  as  essences in  the  sense  relevant  here  is  due  to  our  semantic  dispositions  and
intentions.12
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